Moving foreward as one or at multiple speeds? The EU almost doubled in size (in terms of member states) through the Eastern enlargements since 2004. Under the influence of the Eurozone and migration crises, it then became more divided in recent years. For Luxembourg, these tensions have resulted in a dilemma: on the one hand, the country is very pro-European. Its biggest party (the CSV) is in favour of a federal Union in the long term. It would therefore in principle like to see further integration by all member states. On the other hand, the tensions between member states mean that such a scenario is unrealistic. In this situation, most Luxembourgish politicians prefer a multi-speed model of integration. Such a model would indeed be best for Luxembourg in the coming years. The risk is, of course, that a multi-speed EU becomes even more complex, and that those states that perform worst in a policy area, opt out of integration because they are underperforming. However, the advantage is that the 'coalitions of the willing' can vary from policy to policy, and that all member states are likely to find something where they would like to lead the way. For Luxembourg, it means that the EU cannot be blocked by one or two reluctant states. As Luxembourg is usually strongly in favour of integration, it is likely to be one of the member states that are centrally involved in (almost) all integration projects. In concrete terms, it is one way for Luxembourg and the 'Digital 9' to move forward with the creation of a bigger European digital market that can compete with the US and Asia. However, a multiple-speed approach does not work for all policy areas. For example, Luxembourg is adamant that the EU should have a common migration policy, especially for refugees, where all member states should be obliged to accept a certain number of refugees on their territory. This is seen as a crucial sign of solidarity with those Southern European countries that are the most severely affected by refugee streams. Not only does the government refuse to allow countries to 'opt out' of the burden-sharing, but it also advocates decision-making by majority vote rather than unanimity, to prevent (selfish) national vetoes. Thus, the question is: who decides which policies are obligatory for everyone, and which can be handled in a multiple-speed model? Another source of concern are the suggestions of Jean-Claude Juncker to expand the Eurozone to more Eastern European countries and Schengen to Romania and Bulgaria. The prime minister, Xavier Bettel, prefers to delay these expansions until the countries in question are ready, i.e. fulfil the criteria. This hesitation is wise, in that the recent crises showed that major problems affect the citizens' trust in the EU. It is more important to create policies that function, than to create policies that are big. Finally Luxembourg faces an unusual dilemma over the question whether to replace the Chair of the Eurogroup, who currently reports to the Council of Ministers, with an EU finance minister who would be part of the Commission and report to the parliament. Normally, Luxembourg is in favour of more influence for the Commission and the Parliament, but on this occasion, it is in its interest to defend the influence of the member states: Luxembourg has more influence in the Council than in the European Parliament. Also, once the Parliament gets a greater say in these matters, the control of the states over taxation could erode -and taxation is one of the few national interests that Luxembourg vehemently defends. As in the case of Ireland, corporate taxation is seen as one of the competitive advantages of smaller states, and there is a reluctance to allow for harmonization on the European level. From a national perspective, it would thus be advisable to prevent the creation of an EU finance minister, and to give the Commission a bigger role in a European social pillar instead.
